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On Jan Łukasiewicz’s many-valued logic
and his criticism of determinism
Dariusz Łukasiewicz
Kazimierz Wielki University in Bydgoszcz (Poland)
Résumé : Dans le présent article, on analyse l’assertion, avancée par Jan
Łukasiewicz, que la véracité ou la fausseté des propositions portant sur les
événements futurs contingents implique le déterminisme. Pour éviter le dé-
terminisme, il faut, selon Łukasiewicz, rejeter la logique classique (binaire) et
remplacer cette logique par la logique polyvalente (trivalente). La conception
défendue par Łukasiewicz est examinée en rapport avec la thèse proposée par
Susan Haack, selon laquelle la véracité des propositions portant sur les événe-
ments futurs n’implique aucun déterminisme. Dans l’article, je démontre que
le point de vue de Susan Haack est erroné, car elle ne prend pas en considéra-
tion toutes les prémisses admises par Łukasiewicz. La prémisse la plus impor-
tante concerne la sémantique des verbes du futur. Or, j’essaie de prouver que
Łukasiewicz s’appuie sur la sémantique dite peircienne et non ockhamienne.
J’essaie de prouver que si on prend en considération la prémisse concernant les
verbes du futur, le raisonnement qui a mené Jan Łukasiewicz à créer la logique
trivalente s’avère correct.
Dans la dernière partie de l’article, je signale que la logique trivalente
proposée par Łukasiewicz pose certaines diﬃcultés et je postule la nécessité de
trouver, dans l’avenir, une autre solution du problème de la valeur logique des
phrases sur le futur.
Abstract: The article deals with Jan Łukasiewicz’s thesis that the truth
or falsity of some propositions about the future—future contingents—entails
determinism. According to Łukasiewicz, determinism could be avoided by
rejecting the classical logic (two-valued logic) and replacing it with many-
valued logic (three-valued logic). Łukasiewicz’s position is taken under scrutiny
from the point of view of Susan Haack’s thesis that the truth values of future
contingents do not entail any determinism. I argue in the paper that Haack’s
view is incorrect because it does not take into account all premises accepted
by Łukasiewicz. The most important of them concerns the semantics of future
verbs. Łukasiewicz, as I try to show, assumes the so called Peircean semantics
Philosophia Scientiæ, 15 (2), 2011, 7–20.
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and not the Ockhamist one. Next, I try to argue that it is possible to preserve
the validity of Łukasiewicz’s reasoning which led him to the three-valued logic
by taking into account his assumptions regarding the meaning of future verbs.
In the last part of my paper, I point out that three-valued logic proposed
by Łukasiewicz has some ﬂaws and, therefore, one needs to look for another
solution of the problem of future contingents.
In the second edition of his Aristotle’s Syllogistic from the Standpoint
of Modern Formal Logic [Łukasiewicz 1957], Jan Łukasiewicz included a
new chapter dedicated to Aristotle’s modal syllogistic containing some
philosophically crucial remarks concerning logic, in particular, some re-
marks concerning the role of Aristotle’s concept of “bilateral possibility”,
which had proved especially important for the invention of many-valued
logic. Łukasiewicz became aware of the relation between modalities and
many-valued logic 1 quite early, and these issues must have been impor-
tant for him throughout his lifetime since he returned to them, shortly
before his death, in the second edition of his masterpiece on syllogistic.
The major aim of my paper is to consider the relation between modal-
ities and many-valuedness in the context of Łukasiewicz’s famous crit-
icism of determinism, which he presented in his farewell speech as the
Rector of Warsaw University in 1922. As said before, this criticism of
determinism must have been essential for him and still correct since
he mentioned it again in the second edition of the book dedicated to
Aristotle’s syllogistic. The relation of these three crucial philosophical
ideas, i.e. modality, multivalence and determinism, will be considered in
the context of Susan Haack’s study of Łukasiewicz’s reasoning which led
him to the discovery of the three-valued logic. Haack argued that there
1. At the beginning of his logical activity Łukasiewicz tried to build the modal
calculus on two-valued logic but he grasped soon that it was not possible because
the two-valued system of modal logic based on axioms reporting intuitions regard-
ing modal concepts turned out to be self-contradictory. To avoid contradiction he
should have abandoned some of the intuitive axioms capturing our modal intuitions,
for example, it could be the axiom based on Aristotle’s very intuitive concept of
bilateral possibility (it is possible that p and it is possible that non-p). Therefore,
Łukasiewicz appealed to many-valued logic; ﬁrst, to the three-valued logic and later
on to the inﬁnitely-many-valued logic. Following Tarski he deﬁned possibility as
Mp = CNpp and necessity as Lp = NCpNp but in his essay from 1930 [Łukasiewicz
1930], Łukasiewicz solely pointed out general intuitive conditions which modal cal-
culus should satisfy without having constructed such a system. He presented the
axiomatic system of modal logic in 1953 and also gave the four-valued semantic ma-
trix for the logical connectives. It is worthy of noting that all his modal systems were
always extensional.
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is a logical mistake in Łukasiewicz’s reasoning. I will argue, contrary
to Haack, that there is no mistake in Łukasiewicz’s reasoning provided
that it is considered in an adequate context. The essential point for the
defense of my position is that Łukasiewicz’s criticism of determinism is
based on the “Peircean” (as it was dubbed later on by Arthur Prior) and
not on the Ockhamist semantics. The Peircean semantics is the basis
for the so called incompatibility thesis (IT), which says that the future
is semantically settled if and only if it is causally settled. 2 Thus, the
defense of IT will contribute signiﬁcantly to the defense of my thesis that
Haack’s claim concerning Łukasiewicz’s reasoning is false or, to express
it in a more moderate way, that Haack’s claim is imprecise.
Łukasiewicz’s reasoning—the one criticized by Haack—is encapsu-
lated in the following important passage from Łukasiewicz’s text:
I can suppose without contradiction that my presence in
Warsaw at a deﬁnite moment of time of next year, for ex-
ample, noon of the twenty-ﬁrst of December, is today de-
cided neither in a positive or a negative sense. It is thus
possible, but not necessary, that I shall be in Warsaw at the
given time. On this assumption, the assertion, ‘I shall be in
Warsaw on the twenty-ﬁrst of December next year’ can today
be neither true nor false. For if it were today true, then my
future presence in Warsaw would have to be necessary, and
this contradicts the assumption.
Quoted after [MacCall 1967, 43] 3
2. To be more precise, one should say that the future is semantically settled (or it
would be even better to say: alethically settled) if it is not causally open. And the
future is alethically open at time t with respect to some conceivable future state of
aﬀairs X if and only if for some future time t∗ neither “X will obtain at t∗” nor “X
will not obtain at t∗ is true at t” [Rhoda 2007, 303]. The future is causally open with
respect to state of aﬀairs X, present time t, and future time t∗ if and only if, given
all that exists as of t, it is really possible both that X obtains at t∗ and that X does
not obtain at t∗ [Rhoda 2007, 302]. Thus, alethic openness and causal settledness
are incompatible, and hence the name ‘incompatibility thesis’ (IT).
3. Łukasiewicz’s argument for fatalism was inspired by Aristotle’s reasoning from
De Interpretatione 9. Therefore, Aristotle’s reasoning is worth quoting in detail: “If
a thing is white now, it was true before to say that it would be white, so that of
anything that has taken place, it was always true to say ‘it is’ or ‘it will be’. But if
it was always true to say that a thing is or will be, it is not possible that it should
not be or not come to be, and when a thing cannot not come to be, it is impossible
that it should not come to be, and when it is impossible that it should not come to
be, it must come to be. All then, that is about to be must of necessity take place. It
results from this that nothing is uncertain or fortuitous, for if it were fortuitous, it
would not be necessary”. De Int. 18b 10–16. After [Priest 2008, 251–252].
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According to Haack, Łukasiewicz’s argument is not valid [Haack 1978]. 4
In order to make clear why she regards Łukasiewicz’s argument as un-
satisfactory, I propose a very brief reconstruction of her putative view
below.
Let z be ‘I shall be in Warsaw on the twenty-ﬁrst of December next
year’. Then Łukasiewicz’s reasoning goes as follows:
(1) It is necessary that if it is true now that z will be the case, then
z will be the case.
(2) It is true now that z will be the case. Hence:
(3) It is necessary that z will be the case.
The premise (1) is intuitively true but the reasoning is, as Susan Haack
claims, a kind of modal paradox (modal fallacy: passing from L(A →
B) to (A → LB)).
The problem, according to Łukasiewicz himself, arises under the intu-
itive assumption made by him and based upon bilateral possibility: state
of aﬀairs (or event) z may obtain and z may not obtain. But if it is true
that z will obtain before z obtains, then z is necessary, and not possible
(contingent), which is in contradiction with the assumption; and if it is
false that z will obtain before z does not obtain, then z is impossible,
which is in contradiction with the assumption that z is possible.
If Haack is right, then there is no logical inference between the sub-
sequent: “It is true today that z will obtain” in the conditional: “If it is
true today that z will obtain, then z is necessary” and the consequent
“z is necessary”. The truth of the future-proposition does not entail the
necessity of the future. There is no danger of fatalism which Łukasiewicz
wanted to avoid, and, hence, there is no need to make a revision of the
classical logic by rejecting the principle of bivalence. Thus, the basic
4. In Haack’s opinion, Łukasiewicz’s reasoning is based upon the formula: L(A→
B) → (A → LB). The objection raised by Haack against Łukasiewicz’s reasoning
would be that the necessity of consequence does not imply the necessity of the con-
sequent. However, the proposition: “if it were today true, then my future presence in
Warsaw would have to be necessary” or formally: ‘if A then necessarily B’ is ambigu-
ous [Priest 2008, 132]. It could mean L(A → B), as Haack suggests, or (A → LB).
If ‘if A then necessarily B’ is taken in the ﬁrst sense, then the premise L(A → B) is
true but the argument is invalid since LB cannot be inferred from the set of premises:
{A,L(A → B)}. If ‘if A then necessarily B’ is taken in the second sense, then the
argument is valid since it is allowed to infer LB from: {A, (A → LB)} but there is
no reason to believe the conditional (A → LB) to be true [Priest 2008, 133]. Thus,
regardless of how Łukasiewicz’s (in fact Aristotle’s) argument is presented, it does
not work.
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philosophical reason for multivalent logic, i.e. the danger of fatalism
under the assumption of the principle of bivalence, disappears. 5
However, I think that Łukasiewicz’s reasoning, whose reconstruction
by Haack was based on his utterances from 1930, should be viewed in
the context of Łukasiewicz’s article “On determinism” [Łukasiewicz 1961],
which was prepared on the basis of his speech from 1922, and which was
published for the ﬁrst time in Polish in Łukasiewicz’s collected works
in 1961, already after his death. It was this article that Łukasiewicz
mentioned in the aforesaid philosophical remarks concerning modal logic
added to the posthumous second English edition of Aristotle’s Syllogistic
from the Standpoint of Modern Formal Logic [Łukasiewicz 1957]. This
chronology, I think, gives evidence that Łukasiewicz never abandoned the
ideas expounded in his Rector’s speech from 1922. It is highly probable
that he held them also when he was formulating his reasoning—analyzed
later on by Haack—in the article published for the ﬁrst time in German
in 1930 “Philosophische Bemerkungen zu mehrwertigen Systemen des
Aussagenkalküls” [Łukasiewicz 1930], issued then in Polish in 1961, and
in English in 1967 as “Philosophical Remarks on Many-valued System
of Propositional Logic” in [MacCall 1967]. It is the latter publication
that Haack used when formulating her remarks regarding Łukasiewicz’s
many-valued logic. I suggest that the ﬁnal conclusion which should be
drawn from these historical observations is that Łukasiewicz’s reasoning
from 1930 is an abbreviated version of his reasoning from 1922.
How do these two versions compare? Before we answer the question,
it is recommendable to evoke the most important theses included in the
speech by Łukasiewicz from 1922. He took under scrutiny two main
arguments for determinism—the view, according to which, if A is b at
time t, then it is true at any time prior to t that A is b at t. The ﬁrst
5. It is worthy of noting, however, that there was another, pure formal, reason
for the construction of multivalent logic. Having been acquainted with the matrix
based description of the sentential connectives (it took place before the ﬁrst world
war), Łukasiewicz took into consideration the possibility that, instead of two logical
values, there would be three logical values in the logical matrix, i.e., “0”, “1” and
additionally the third logical value “2”. Then, however, he could not ﬁnd any intuitive
interpretation for that third logical value “2”, and as he confessed, if he had never
found such an interpretation, the three-valued logic, and many-valued logic, would
have never been constructed (one should add: at least by him), cf. [Łukasiewicz 1998,
243]. A bit later, in 1917, the idea of the third logical value as logical representation of
objective possibility became clear for Łukasiewicz, as he reported it in his speech from
1918, and it appeared again in 1920 when he was trying to build the logical matrix
characterizing the logical properties of modal propositions. At that time Łukasiewicz
introduced again the logical value “2” and called it “possibility” [Woleński 1989, 122].
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argument for determinism appeals to the law of the excluded middle, and
the second one to the principle of causality. There is no need to present
in detail Łukasiewicz’s analyses, but one thing is very important for our
purposes: Łukasiewicz observed that the two arguments complete each
other. In the ﬁrst argument one uses the linguistic form: “It is true at
time t that z” or “It is the case at t that z”. The second argument (from
the principle of causality) provides us with the meaning of the form: “It
is true at time t that z”. The expression “It is true at time t that z”
means: “there exists at time t a cause of z”. Thus, we can conclude that
Łukasiewicz accepted the thesis that a proposition about some future
event z has the logical value at any time t prior to z (say at time u) if
and only if there exists the cause of z at t. However, the last thesis is
tantamount to IT, i.e. that the future is semantically settled if and only
if it is causally settled. It follows from IT that if there is now no cause of
z, then the future tense proposition concerning z is now not true. If, on
the other hand, there exists now the cause of z, then z must obtain at
the future time, say, u, or, in other words, z is causally necessary. The
last conclusion follows from the nature of causality: if there is a cause
there must be an eﬀect. Thus, the truth of the proposition regarding
z at t prior to u is the guarantee of the necessity of z and the causal
necessity of z is the guarantee of the truth of the proposition regarding
z at t (t < u). Let us repeat: if there exists at time t the cause of z, then
z is necessary. Therefore, Łukasiewicz’s reasoning would be as follows.
(1) It is necessary that if it is true now that z will be the case, then
z will be the case.
(2’) It is necessary that it is true now that z will be the case. Hence:
(3) It is necessary that z will be the case.
Thus, the reasoning is formally and materially valid, and the thesis of
fatalism that the future is necessary provided that future-propositions
are semantically settled is valid as well. Therefore, it is not surprising
that to avoid fatalism Łukasiewicz had to reject some of the premises of
his reasoning.
A critical role in the debate over the future contingency is played
by the belief that IT is true. But why could it not be the case that
a proposition regarding future is at any time t prior to u (the time of
z’s obtaining), i.e., before the future event z occurs, true in spite of the
fact that there exists no cause of z at t? Why can’t the truth of future-
propositions be grounded in the future events only, but it must be based
upon the present (past) state of the world? In other words, what are
the reasons for the defense of the Peircean semantics expressed in IT?
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It seems that Łukasiewicz did not provide us with a satisfying justiﬁca-
tion of IT, and he did not consider reasons supporting the Ockhamist
semantics that rejects IT.
I think that one should search for an answer to the last question con-
cerning a possible defense of the Peircean semantics in the common lan-
guage (the second domain of search are the theories of time and truth).
This type of defense of the Peircean semantics has been given recently
by the proponents of IT, and, since I think that it is in principle correct,
I will brieﬂy present the main points of it below. The crucial role here
is played by the semantic analysis of verbs in the future tense. Future
verbs can have various functions; they can be used in a performative,
erotetic and predictive sense. The performative function is exempliﬁed,
for example, by the verb pay back in the sentence (promise) “I will pay
you back”— the sentence expresses a promise of paying a debt. The
question: “Will you marry me?” expresses an erotetic force and a desire
for some state of aﬀairs to obtain. The predictive function of future
verbs is realized in the proposition: “It will rain tomorrow”. It is, how-
ever, only the predictive function which is relevant for the justiﬁcation
of IT. The predictive function consists in the expression of a speaker’s
belief regarding the future that it is now (at the moment of utterance)
true [Rhoda, Boyd, & Belt 2006, 443], The verb occurring in such a role
refers to the time which is future in relation to the time of utterance,
and that constituent of the verb’s meaning which is responsible for the
predictive function is called “future temporal force”. The proponents
of the Peircean semantics claim that future verbs carry another mean-
ing, or meaning component, called “causal force”. Causal force of future
verbs can be deterministic or probabilistic. The proposition: “If you let
go of that rock, it will fall” expresses the speaker’s belief that there is
no possibility that things might turn out otherwise [Rhoda, Boyd, &
Belt 2006, 443]. The expressed probability contained in the speaker’s
belief is 1. But, if a mother warns her child by saying: “Don’t go out
without your jacket or you will catch a cold” it is not the causal in-
evitability which she means but only probability, which is less than 1
but greater than 0.
The Peircean argument for the thesis that the future verb carrying
predictive function has also causal force is the pragmatic principle of
charity whose important constituent is the rule of rational assertibility.
The principle of charity says that one should interpret a person’s beliefs
in a manner that preserves the rational assertibility of her claims pro-
vided that it is allowed by the semantic ﬂexibility and the context of the
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utterance. It is important to interpret claims about the world made by
a given person at some place and time in the context of her presupposed
knowledge. The essential point of the principle of charity is the assump-
tion of rationality of the subject whose utterances are interpreted. Thus,
if someone makes claims whose content is not coherent with her knowl-
edge of the world which, as we presuppose, is at the disposal of that
person, that claim should not be treated as a serious claim about the
world, but rather as a joke, or a lie. But if someone says seriously, for
example, that “It will rain tomorrow”, then we are obliged to interpret
this sentence in such a way that a given person knows something about
the present state of the world which will cause tomorrow rain. Such a
person has rational reasons for the belief what will be the case tomor-
row. In brief, we attribute a causal force to future verbs used by the
speaker in the predictive function by interpreting the speaker’s utter-
ances with the aid of the principle of charity and rational assertibility. If
it happens that someone seriously says something about the world (its
future state) which is not consistent with the presupposed knowledge of
the language user about the world, then that claim should not be inter-
preted as possessing predictive force. It can happen, for example, that
someone playing roulette says that: “The ball will land on 20” (there
are 36 possible numbers to be chosen), so the odds are 1 in 36, and,
hence, it is more probable that the ball will not land on 20. If we have
no evidence that a person making that claim has reasons to believe that
the game is, say, “rigged”, then it would be more rational to say that the
ball will not land on 20 than that it will. According to the proponents
of the Peircean semantics, such an utterance should be construed as an
autobiographical claim about the speaker and not as a prediction about
the ball. Thus, if a speaker says: “The ball will land on 20”, then he
means either: “I’m guessing that the ball lands on 20”, or “I hope the
ball lands on 20”, or, for example, “I’m betting on 20”. If this analysis
of future verbs is correct, then IT seems to be justiﬁed; future tense
propositions about future events are now true if and only if there exists
now the cause of these future events.
It is worthy of note here that there is an Ockhamist argument against
Peircean semantics and IT, and it is also based on the colloquial usage
of language. The Ockhamist semantics is a theory of meaning which
does not claim that future verbs playing predictive role carry any causal
force, their role is predictive only. The reason why it is so is found in
the colloquial usage of language when we attribute truth to a sentence
about future contingents after things turned out as predicted. Yesterday,
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for example, I said: “it will rain tomorrow” and it has turned out today
that it is raining. It means, that it was true yesterday that it would
rain the next day. The truth of the sentences about future contingents
uttered before the future has taken place has its grounds in the future
and not in the state of the world at the time when the sentences were
uttered. It is the rule “is implies was (will)” (IIWW) which is at work
here. However, this rule is not logically obvious, and even, as some
proponents of the Peircean semantics argue, it is false. From the fact
that we often retrospectively apply the term ‘true’ to propositions about
future contingents when the events predicted in them have occurred it
does not follow that the propositions were true when they were expressed
[Rhoda, Boyd, & Belt 2006, 447]. The only conclusion which can be
drawn in such a case is that it was true when a given prediction was
made that a predicted event might occur but, of course, this is something
completely diﬀerent from saying that it is true that an event will occur.
However, such reasoning based upon the colloquial usage of language
is not satisfying for someone who resorts to the ﬁndings of contemporary
linguistics, according to which, it is not the case that there exist future
verbs, or even, the very concept of future, in all known languages. 6
Therefore, in order to defend IT, one should and one can appeal to
philosophical arguments which are free from the semantics of colloquial
languages. The philosophical argumentation which is meant here relies
on the theory of time and the theory of truth, so, it has a metaphysical
and epistemological character. It is the so called A theory of time and
the classical (correspondence) theory of truth which are meant by the
proponents of IT appealing to the philosophical argumentation in defense
of IT. The theory of time A (presentism) says that everything that exists
is present. All past facts and all future facts exist now or do not exist at
all. In opposition to presentism, eternalism maintains that there obtain
past facts and future facts and they do not obtain now but the past facts
obtain in the past and the future facts obtain in the future. The past and
the future are, however, inaccessible for us from the present time. The
past and the future obtain outside the present, as completely settled.
The correspondence theory of truth says, in turn, that a proposition is
true if and only if there obtains a state of aﬀairs posited in the proposi-
6. Of special interest in this respect is Dan Everett’s research concerning the
Piraha language and culture from the Amazon. The language lacks many features
often seen as essential to any human language, such as recursive rules, basic numerals,
linguistic resources to express distant future and past, and others, [Sampson, Gil, &
Trudgill 2009, 213].
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tion. Given that we accept presentism, a proposition is true if there now
obtains the posited state of aﬀairs, because if it does not obtain now,
it does not obtain at all. Thus, a proposition about future contingents
is true now if there obtains a state of aﬀairs posited in that proposi-
tion. In other words, the future is contained in the present. But how
is it possible? It is possible solely because there exist now the causes of
future events, i.e. eﬀects are contained in their causes. Thus, if a propo-
sition about the future is true (is semantically settled), then the future
is causally settled, and conversely, but this would mean that IT is true
[Rhoda, Boyd, & Belt 2006].
If it were so, then Łukasiewicz’s conclusion that the preeternity of
truth implies fatalism would be correct, and the only way to avoid the fa-
talistic view would consist in rejecting premises leading to it. Łukasiewicz
decided to reject the principle of bivalence or, in other words, to change
metalogic. At the beginning of his philosophical activity, after publish-
ing On the principle of contradiction in Aristotle in 1910, Łukasiewicz
believed, like Taduesz Kotarbiński, that there is a relation between the
law of the excluded middle and determinism. The refutation of deter-
minism would entail the rejection of the law of the excluded middle, i.e.
it would be a weakening of the classical logic. However, the revision of
metalogic by the rejection of the principle of bivalence and the introduc-
tion of the third logical value 1/2 conceived as objective possibility (or
logical indeterminacy) made later on by Łukasiewicz entailed ﬁnally both
rejection of the law of the excluded middle and the law of contradiction.
The solution proposed by Łukasiewicz in his system of the three-valued
logic seemed very controversial and was severely criticized. Already in
1938, F. Gonseth, for example, noticed that the formal description of
connectives in Łukasiewicz’s logic cannot be made coherent with any of
the two proposed senses of the third logical value 1/2, i.e. with the ob-
jective possibility or logical indeterminacy [Malinowski 2006, 14]. If we
consider two propositions, Gonseth argued, p and ∼p, and assume that
p is logically undetermined (neither true nor false but the third), then
∼ p is also logically undetermined. Therefore, according to the semantic
matrix of conjunction ﬁxed by Łukasiewicz for the three-valued logic,
the conjunction p ∧ ∼ p should also be logically undetermined but it is
clearly not very intuitive. It is so because the conjunction p ∧ ∼ p is
false regardless of the content of p, and, hence, p or ∼p should be false.
The similar counterintuitive results arise if we take into consideration
the alternative p∨ ∼ p. 7
7. To illustrate the last case, let us consider the following example of the alterna-
tive: “A woman will be the President of the Republic of Poland in 2020 or a woman
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Łukasiewicz mentioned also another possible avoidance of the danger
of fatalism in the context of the reasoning considered at the beginning
of this paper. If IT is true, then, for example, the propositions: “It is
true at time t that John will not be at home tomorrow afternoon” and
“It is true at time t that John will be at home tomorrow afternoon”
cannot be both true (they are both false) unless there exist at t the
causes of John’s presence at home tomorrow or John’s absence at home
tomorrow. The latter situation does not violate the law of the excluded
middle because the two considered propositions are not contradictory.
While the alternative: “John will be at home tomorrow afternoon or
John will not be at home tomorrow afternoon” must be true because
either there will exist in the future the causal sequence whose eﬀect will
be John’s presence at home or there will exist in the future the causal
sequence whose eﬀect will be John’s absence at home. 8 This solution,
however, did not satisfy Łukasiewicz because it did not take into account
the diﬀerence between the situation when the proposition: “It is true at
time t that John will be at home tomorrow afternoon” is false because
there exists now the cause of John’s absence at home tomorrow and the
situation when it is still an open question what will be tomorrow with
John and his presence at his home. It is reasonable only in the ﬁrst
case to take the proposition in question as false. While in regard to
the second case it is not allowed and the logical value of the proposition
will not be the President of the Republic of Poland in 2020”. This alternative is
neither true nor false since both constituents of it do not have any logical value. But
there is no other possibility: a woman will be the President of the Republic of Poland
in 2020 or a woman will not be the President of the Republic of Poland in 2020. One
of the two propositions must be true. If they both were logically undetermined, it
could be impossible to attribute falsity to the complex proposition: “A woman will
be the President of the Republic of Poland in 2020 and a woman will not be the
President of the Republic of Poland in 2020”. But, of course, this proposition is false
because it is not possible that a woman is the President of the Republic of Poland
and is not at one and the same time. The problem of the intuitive interpretation of
the three-valued logic was considered many times by various logicians, [Prior 1967],
[Borkowski 1977], [Woleński 1990], [Craig 1991], returned to this issue in their writ-
ings. Perhaps it is also worthy of note that the controversy over the revision of logic
was widely discussed in Poland by the eminent logicians from the circle of Kazimierz
Twardowski after publishing On the principle of contradiction in Aristotle by Jan
Łukasiewicz in regard to the free will-determinism debate at the beginning of the
20th century. Stanisław Leśniewski even tried to prove that logically undetermined
propositions are impossible, but ﬁnally he was not successful, [Woleński 1990].
8. In his criticism of determinism Łukasiewicz does not reject the principle of
causality but the thesis that the causes of the future events exist eternally. According
to him, the causes of some future events do not exist now and as long as they do not
exist those events are not determined.
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is undecided (the proposition is neither accepted nor rejected) and, in
consequence, the negation of that proposition: “It is not true at time t
that John will be at home tomorrow afternoon” is undecided as well. 9
Łukasiewicz’s intuition regarding the logical values of these propositions
was that they should be captured by the rejection of the principle of
bivalence and the introduction of the third logical value—the objective
possibility. 10 But, as we said, this solution, in turn, is in conﬂict with
our intuition. 11
Summing up, if Susan Haack is wrong and Łukasiewicz’s reasoning
analyzed above is valid, and if we keep in mind the critical remarks
concerning his way of avoiding fatalism, it is more convenient not to
reject the principle of bivalence but to look for another solution.
9. But, if it is so, then also the alternative: “It is true at time t that John will
be at home tomorrow afternoon or it is not true at time t that John will be at
home tomorrow afternoon” and the conjunction: “It is true at time t that John will
be at home tomorrow afternoon and it is not true at time t that John will be at
home tomorrow afternoon” are not logically determined, which is not intuitive. The
intuition tells us that the conjunction of the two propositions is false, and hence, one
of them has to be false, and, therefore, it is not true that they both are neither true
nor false.
10. Łukasiewicz was under the direct impact of Aristotle’s remarks included in De
Interpretatione 9. According to Aristotle’s reasoning, the disjunction: “either a sea
ﬁght will take place tomorrow or a sea ﬁght will not take place tomorrow” is now
true and necessary, but it is not true now that a sea ﬁght will take place tomorrow
or that a sea ﬁght will not take place tomorrow. These propositions concern future
contingent events and they are now neither true nor false. Łukasiewicz makes it clear
that Aristotle by doing that does not undermine the principle of excluded middle but
the principle of bivalence which he formulated himself. Both Stoics and Epicureans
understood Aristotle’s teaching in this way. However, it must be said that Łukasiewicz
did not take over the already elaborated Aristotle’s views but he made them much
more precise. He pointed out that Aristotle himself was not clear and sure enough as
to his ﬁnal view concerning future contingent.
11. Perhaps the conﬂict would disappear either by changing logical valuation (by
a bit diﬀerent semantic matrix for the sentential connectives than these proposed by
Łukasiewicz himself), by extending the three-valued logic to one with more values or
by using the technique of supervaluation. According to the last method, the law of the
excluded middle holds even though p may be neither true nor false [Priest 2008, 134].
It is also possible to solve the problem by giving up Łukasiewicz’s intuition mentioned
above and by maintaining that assertoric propositions about the future are false until
the future is settled, and that modal propositions about a future contingent event z:
“z may occur” and “z may not occur” are both true until the future is settled. Such
a proposal has been recently formulated by Boyd, Belt and Rhoda [Rhoda, Boyd, &
Belt 2006]. According to their approach, both future tense propositions and future
tenseless propositions are false. Thus, two propositions such that one is the negation
of the other are not contradictory but logically contrary.
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